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Abstract: 
This paper analyses the interaction between the political and economic reforms undertaken in 
post-communist countries since the early 1990s. The empirical investigation uses panel data 
from 27 transition countries for the period 1991 to 2005. Democratisation has led to market 
economic reforms, while the extent of economic reforms has not had any discernable effect 
on political developments. Macroeconomic performance has had little or no effect on political 
and economic reforms, while wars and civil strife have held back both kinds of reforms. 
Initial conditions have played an important role regarding the outcome of the transition: large 
macroeconomic distortions and a low development level have produced less democratisation 
and fewer market economic reforms. The prospect of EU membership has reinforced 
democratisation but has slowed economic reforms in the applicant countries. 
Keywords:  transition, economic reform, political reform
JEL classification:  O52, P24
1. introduction
The communist countries were characterised by repressed political systems, with 
the communist party in a predominant role and economies based on government 
ownership of the means of production combined with some form of central 
planning. The transition process started when the communist parties lost their 
will – or ability – to retain their dominant roles, in many cases in connection with 
the break-up of multiethnic states. 
The dual transition of political and economic structures has advanced very 
differently across the almost 30 countries emerging from the former Eastern 
Bloc. The Baltic and the Central European countries moved quickly to introduce 
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democracy and market-based economies. These countries have become members 
of the European Union and have developed political and economic systems that 
do not differ fundamentally from those in the West European member states. At 
the other extreme, most of the Central Asian transition countries have retained 
authoritarian regimes and few market economic reforms have been implemented. 
Between these extremes there are groups of countries where the transition process 
is still unfolding. Many of the transition countries in the Balkan region have 
experienced civil war, with the result that political and economic reform was 
stunted for years. The core Slavic countries have seen both political and economic 
upheavals; since its financial collapse in 1998, Russia has moved towards more 
authoritarian rule and more state interference in the economy. The Caucasus 
region has proven volatile in both political and economic terms. 
The “guided tour” above suggests that there has been no conflict between 
political and economic reforms in post-communist countries: countries with 
democratic systems have restructured their economies, while countries with 
authoritarian rule have retained a large degree of government interference in the 
economy.
At the beginning of the transition process in the early 1990s, it was by 
no means clear that political reforms would co-exist easily with market-based 
economic reforms. The Southeast Asian tiger economies as well as Chile in Latin 
America modernised their economies during decades of (semi-)authoritarian 
rule before eventually introducing democratic means of government (Armijo 
et al. 1994). A possible rationalisation of this pattern was that authoritarian 
governments could implement policies in the interest of the common good and 
withstand pressure from business and the public at large for preferential treatment. 
In this rendition there exists a trade-off or incompatibility between democratic rule 
and fundamental reforms of the economy with payoffs only occurring years into 
the future. 
The finding that the transition economies have not followed the pattern 
in Southeast Asia and Latin America is now established in the literature (Bunce 
2001). Democratic and economic reforms have not proven mutually exclusive in 
post-communist countries. The linkages and the dynamic interaction between 
democratisation on the one hand and economic reforms on the other hand have 
received much less attention, especially in the empirical literature, with Fidrmuc 
(2003) as a prime exception. 
This paper sets out to investigate in some detail the links between democ-
ratisation and market economic reforms. The main topic of investigation is how 
political and economic reforms have affected each other over time; i.e. have 
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reforms, or have both occurred? The second topic concerns other variables that 
help explain political and economic reforms. In particular, how do initial condi-
tions, macroeconomic developments and institutional anchoring in the form of 
prospective EU membership affect the reform process?
The empirical analysis employs a panel of data from 27 transition countries 
for the period 1991 to 2005. The results from simple Granger causality tests, 
single-equation panel regressions with many covariates and panel data cointegra-
tion analyses are broadly in concurrence: democratisation has led to market 
economic reforms, while the extent of economic reforms has not had any discern-
able effect on political developments. Overall, political reforms are to a large extent 
autonomous in relation to economic reforms and macroeconomic developments 
in post-communist countries, while unfavourable initial conditions, civil strife and 
political isolation from the West have proven detrimental to political liberalisation. 
Market economic reforms have been aided by democratisation and favourable 
initial conditions, but have been held back by war and civil strife. 
The paper extends the study by Fidrmuc (2003) in several directions: i) the 
sample endpoint is extended from 2000 to 2005; ii) additional control variables 
are employed; iii) the importance of initial conditions is assessed and tested explic-
itly; iv) the time series properties of the main variables are examined; v) possible 
econometric problems from an estimation of panels with lagged endogenous 
variables are addressed; vi) the results with respect to dynamic linkages between 
political and economic reforms are replicated using panel-based error-correction 
econometrics. The main contributions of this paper are to show the importance of 
initial conditions, the unimportance of macroeconomic variables and the robust-
ness of the results with respect to the linkages between the two reform elements.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature 
in the field. Section 3 gives an overview of the dual transition as captured by 
numerical indices for political and market economic reforms. Section 4 analyses 
the dynamic properties of the selected indices. Section 5 presents panel data 
models of the determinants of political and economic reforms respectively. Section 
6 uses co-integration and error-correction analysis to assess in more detail the 
dynamics of the political and economic reforms. Section 7 concludes.
2. literature overview
The importance of the links between political and economic change has been 
acknowledged for centuries. The first writings within economics placed great 
emphasis on political economy issues (e.g. Ricardo 1817). Investigation of the 
links between political and economic organisation gained momentum after the 116  Karsten Staehr
Second World War, partly motivated by decolonisation and the containment of 
communism. The modernisation theory was an important contribution with its 
claim of a positive correlation between democracy and economic modernisation 
(Lipset 1959).2 
The third wave of democratisation set off in Southern Europe in the 1970s, 
moved to Latin America and Asia in the 1980s and culminated in post-communist 
countries in the 1990s (Diamond 1999, ch. 2). The third wave of democratisation 
brought renewed impetus to the field. The literature can be broadly divided into 
two camps, i.e. contributions that focus on possible tensions between democratisa-
tion and economic reform and contributions that argue that democratisation and 
economic reform are compatible (Bunce 2001). 
Armijo et al. (1994) belong to the camp that is sceptical of a simultaneous 
implementation of political and economic reforms. Their main argument is that 
market economic reforms are likely to reduce production in the short term, and 
that economic hardship will undermine public support for further reforms (see 
also UNDP 1999). Based on experiences from Latin America and Southeast Asia, 
Armijo et al. (1994) suggest two possible solutions. One is an “economy first 
strategy”, where economic reforms are implemented prior to democratic reforms. 
The other solution is a “policy first strategy”, where democratic reforms predate 
economic reforms and the economic transformation is halted until democracy has 
consolidated and become robust.
The argumentation in Armija et al. (1994) and related work (see Bunce 2001) 
rest on the assumption that the electorate cast their votes based on short-term 
concerns and disregard their long-term interest. It is, however, possible to establish 
in rational choice models the argument that democracy leads to a status quo bias 
where socially beneficial reforms are postponed or abandoned altogether. Alesina 
& Drazen (1991) develop a model where ex ante uncertainty with respect to the 
distribution of the long-term gains from reforms leads to a war of attrition over the 
distribution of the short-term costs of reforms. The result is that economic reforms 
that benefit everybody in society do not gain electoral support and are postponed 
in a war of attrition. 
Another example regards reforms that are potentially Pareto improving, but 
beneficial to parts of the electorate while harming others. Ex ante uncertainty of 
the distribution of winners and losers can lead the majority of the electorate to 
prefer the status quo and hence vote against potentially Pareto improving reforms 
2  Acemoglu et al. (2005) cast doubt on this claim by showing that the correlation between income 
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(Fernandez & Rodrik 1991). This result holds even when the voters are risk 
neutral. Consider the case where a minority of voters knows for sure that they will 
gain from reforms, while the majority of voters ex ante are uncertain whether they 
individually will win or lose. To gain a majority for reforms, some of the uncertain 
voters must vote for reforms, but all uncertain voters may vote against them if the 
expected payoff from reforms for this group of voters is below the payoff from the 
status quo.
The status quo bias can be reduced or eliminated if there exists a credible 
mechanism or institution that redistributes parts of the winners’ gains in order 
to compensate the losers. It has been argued that democracy may actually reduce 
public resistance to economic reforms with ex ante uncertainty because a democ-
racy is inclusive: democratically elected decision-makers will take into account the 
welfare of a large part of the population and the voters may therefore expect that 
the losers of reform will be compensated, which again implies that they will not 
resist the reforms (Olson 1993).
A number of theories suggest that democratisation and economic reforms are 
compatible. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) formalise several of the positions of the 
modernisation theory. Economic reforms leading to an advanced market economy 
will make it more difficult for the governing elite to repress the majority, partly 
because the market economy requires the involvement and active participation of 
the public. Repression will thus be disproportionately expensive in an advanced 
market economy and it is therefore beneficial for the elite to accept democratic 
rule. The upshot is that democratisation and market transformation will co-exist.
Related theories focus on the importance of formal institutions in a market 
economy (North 1990, Shleifer 1997). The state holds a central position in 
the transition process by setting the “rules of the game” and by redistributing 
resources in the economy. Individuals and firms have an incentive to engage in 
“rent seeking” through the bribery of politicians and officials or through less direct 
means of coercion of the decision-making process. Rent seeking is facilitated by an 
economy with large government intervention, and individuals and firms engaged 
in enriching themselves via rent seeking will therefore oppose market economic 
reforms. Democracy and public participation in the decision-making process will 
likely reduce the extent of corruption and rent seeking, as politicians and other 
officials are more likely to be exposed and punished for their misdeeds (Aslund 
2002, ch. 9; EBRD 1999, ch. 5). This argumentation implies that democracy 
will weaken the powers of rent-seeking individuals and firms and hence facilitate 
market economic reforms. 
The number of empirical studies using formal econometric methods to 
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countries is limited. de Melo et al. (1996) is an early study which uses panel data 
to show that political and economic reforms are closely correlated in transition 
countries, although the authors do not attempt to uncover any causal links. They 
find that an absence of armed conflicts and an initial high development level 
advance democratic reform. Falcetti et al. (2005) use panel data for the period 
1989-2003 and show that democracy is positively correlated with economic 
reform, although the correlation is strongest at the beginning of the transition 
process. They also do not attempt to establish the direction of causality.
Dethier et al. (1999) use panel data and also find that democratic reforms are 
positively correlated with economic reforms in post-communist countries. They 
show, however, that the relationship to a large extent stems from underlying factors 
like the countries’ initial conditions. Countries that have undertaken democratic 
reforms have had favourable initial conditions, and the favourable initial condi-
tions have also affected the economic transformation positively. They also show 
that foreign economic support is positively correlated with the extent of economic 
reform. 
Fidrmuc (2003) uses panel data from 25 transition countries for the period 
1990-2000 to examine how political and economic reforms interact. He finds that 
political reforms Granger cause economic reforms, but that the opposite is not the 
case. (Granger causality entails that the cause predates the effect and helps predict 
it.) This result is robust to the inclusion of a limited number of control variables. 
Kwon (2004) shows using panel data that while economic reform has been 
unimportant for the development of democracy in post-communist countries, 
economic reform has tended to impede democratisation in Latin American 
countries. Kwon (2004) proceeds to show that within post-communist countries, 
economic reforms have contributed to democratisation in the countries that 
liberalised their economies at an early stage, but not in other transition countries. 
The sample sizes are, however, very small and few control variables are included.
Several empirical studies seek to incorporate explicitly voting behaviour and 
institutional factors of policy-making when analysing the pattern of political and 
economic reforms (see also the discussion in Bunce 2003). Kitschelt (2001) shows 
that initial conditions are important explanatory variables for economic reform in 
post-communist countries, while political institutions have played only a limited 
role.
Norgaard (2000, ch. 5) uses cross-sectional data and concludes that the extent 
of economic reforms is correlated with the countries’ initial conditions, but not 
with measures of public support for economic reforms. Wykoff (2001) finds, 
using a sample of six transition countries, that the implemented economic reforms 
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conditions. Kostadinova (2004) employs cross-sectional data on a wider set of 
post-communist countries and reaches similar conclusions. The initial conditions 
determining voting behaviour are the length of communist rule, the dominating 
religion and the (physical) distance from Western Europe.
Kim & Pirttila (2003) find that unemployment and inequality reduce the 
support of the population for further economic reforms. Their findings suggest 
that economic reforms that are beneficial in the long term but bring about 
economic hardship in the short term will not gain support from the electorate. 
In other words, democracy may reduce the likelihood of market-based economic 
reforms being carried out. Fidrmuc (2000) also finds that voters cast their vote for 
parties either supporting or opposing economic reforms in ways reflecting their 
individual economic situation.
In sum, from a conceptual viewpoint democracy and market-based reforms 
can be in conflict as well as mutually compatible. The empirical evidence 
shows that the two types of reforms are positively correlated in post-communist 
countries, but the dynamic interaction of political and economic reforms is little-
researched. 
3. Reforms in Post-Communist Countries
In spite of all the Eastern bloc countries being governed by communist parties, 
there were substantial differences across their political and economic systems 
(Aslund 2002: ch. 2). After the fall of communism the politicians in power in 
all of the countries declared their intention to create a new social order based on 
democracy and market economic principles. It is outside the scope of this paper 
to provide even an overview of the ensuring dual transition; the complexities 
and variations across countries and time are simply too large. We instead present 
summary indices giving a broad picture of developments from the late 1980s until 
2005. (See Appendix for sources and a detailed description of data.)
The independent think-tank “Freedom House” annually publishes two 
indexes depicting, respectively, political rights and civil liberties of the public in 
almost all countries in the world (Freedom House 2006). The two indices are 
closely correlated. We have constructed the index FH as 8 minus a simple average 
of the two Freedom House indexes. The FH index lies in the interval from 1 to 
7. A higher index implies that democratic and civil rights are observed to a larger 
extent. According to Freedom House a country is “free” if its FH is in the interval 
5-7, “partly free” if FH is in the interval 3-4.5 and “not free” if FH is in the 
interval 1-2.5.120  Karsten Staehr
To ease the presentation, we divide the 27 post-communist countries in our 
sample into 6 geographically demarcated regions:
•	 Baltics – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 
•	 Central Europe – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia.
•	 Balkans – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania.
•	 Western CIS – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova.
•	 Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia.
•	 Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the FH index for each of the six country groups 
during the period 1988-2005. The Central European and Baltic country groups 
democratised quickly and had on average “free” political systems already at the 
end of 1991. Political reforms only gained momentum in the group of Balkan 
countries after the end of the Yugoslavian civil war at the beginning of the 21st 
century. The Central Asian countries have retained autocratic rule comparable to 
the level in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. The groups of Western CIS 
countries and Caucasus countries are situated between these extremes. The increas-
ingly authoritarian rule in Belarus and Russia is evidenced by a gradual lowering of 
the FH index for the group of Western CIS countries since 1994, only interrupted 
in 2005 when the democratisation following Ukraine’s Orange Revolution lifted 
the index. 
Figure 1: Democracy index FH for regional groups of post-communist countries, 
1988-2005
Notes: FH is calculated as eight minus the average of indices for political rights and civil liberties. The 
minimum 1 indicates few democratic rights, while the maximum 7 indicates many democratic rights.
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The countries emerging from the Eastern bloc commenced their economic reforms 
from different starting points in terms of development level, macroeconomic 
distortions, previous reform efforts and degrees of economic crisis (de Melo et 
al. 1996). Broad-based market economic reforms were initiated in January 1990 
when Poland brought in a major reform package, followed the same year by 
countries emerging from Yugoslavia. Several Central European countries followed 
in 1991, while the countries emerging from the Soviet Union largely began their 
economic reforms in 1992 (Fischer & Sahay 2004).
The market reforms were to some degree inspired by the experience from 
Latin America, where many counties had implemented such reforms during the 
1980s (Blanchard et al. 1991). A reform package customarily consisted of four 





Figure 2 shows – for each of the six country groups – an aggregate economic 
reform index, which has been labelled EBRD in recognition of the data source. 
The index is a simple average of eight indices capturing the extent of liberalisa-
tion, privatisation and structural reforms as reported in the annual Transition 
Report from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (see also 
Appendix). The minimum value 1 corresponds to a situation with no market 
reforms, while the maximum value 4.33 signifies that institutions and governance 
correspond to “best practice” levels in market economies. (Values above 4 are 
infrequent.)122  Karsten Staehr
Figure 2: Aggregate economic reform index EBRD for regional groups of post-
communist countries, 1989-2005
Notes: EBRD is an unweighted  average of  eight reform indices. The minimum 1 indicates no  market 
reforms, while the maximum 4.33 indicates “best practice” in a market economy.
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Already before the reform process began, there were countries with an aggregate 
economic reform index above 1, i.e. with some elements of market principles in 
the economy. The reform intensity in the Baltics and Central Europe has been 
markedly higher than in the other regions, especially in the beginning of the 
reform process. The index for Western CIS dived after the Russian financial crisis 
in 1998. The groups of countries comprising the Balkan and Caucasus regions 
have attained steady but relatively slow reform progress. The Central Asian group 
of countries have effectively not undertaken any market reforms since 1995. 
In comparing Figures 1 and 2 it is apparent that the FH and EBRD indexes 
for the six country groups move together. In Figure 3 the 2003-05 average of 
the democracy index FH is plotted against the 2003-05 average of the aggregate 
economic reform index EBRD for each of the 27 transition countries. 
There is a positive correlation between the levels of democracy and economic 
reform in the transition countries. It is noticeable, however, that among the 
countries which in 2003-05 had an average EBRD around 3, there were countries 
having a democracy index FH within the entire range from 2.5 to 6. Moreover, the 
pattern of correlation in Figure 3 does not yield information on causal linkages, 
i.e. whether democratisation leads to economic reforms, whether economic reform 
leads to democratisation, or whether underlying factors affect both variables. Linkages between Political and Economic Reforms in Post-Communist Countries  123
Figure 3: Democracy and economic reform indices in 27 post-communist 
countries, 2003-05 averages of FH and EBRD
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4. Data Properties and Granger Causality Tests
We start our empirical investigation of the links between political and economic 
reforms by examining the time series properties of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis. It is not clear from Figures 1 and 2 whether the democracy 
index FH and the economic reform index EBRD are stationary or unit root series. 
Formal testing is required to address this question. 
We will in later regressions include variables for GDP change measured as 
a percentage change per year, GY. We will sometimes refer to this variable as 
economic growth, but the annual frequency and the short time span mean that 
the variable GY should be thought of as year-to-year changes in the production 
volume rather than any long-term growth trend. A variable depicting consumer 
price inflation is also included. The inflation rate was extremely high in many 
transition countries in the early and mid-1990s. We have therefore applied the 
logarithm to the percentage inflation rate (plus 100), and labelled the resulting 
inflation variable LΠ. 
Table 1 shows a summary of five different panel unit root tests for the vari-
ables FH, EBRD, GY and LΠ. The tests are essentially standard multiple-series 
unit root tests that have been used on panel data structures. As frequently observed 
with panel unit root tests, the results of different tests are not in full accordance. 124  Karsten Staehr
The overall result is that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all four 
variables, suggesting that the panel data series are stationary. In the cases of FH, 
EBRD and GY one or more of the tests are not able to reject the null hypothesis of 
a unit root. 
Table 1: Panel unit tests, 27 transition countries, 1990–2005












–15.73*** –1.12 –10.19*** 428.6*** 447.5***
[0.000] [0.132] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
EBRD
–21.05*** 1.35 –11.58*** 152.8*** 333.9***
[0.000] [0.912] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GY
-4.28*** -4.32*** -1.72*** 70.1*** 54.2
[0.000] [0.000] [0.042] [0.068] [0.468]
LΠ
-18.58*** -4.21** -12.12*** 136.2*** 125.9***
[0.000] [0.037] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series in the panel contain a unit root. Lag lengths for the Levin 
Lin Chu, the Breitung, the Im Pesaran Shin and the ADF Fisher χ2 test were selected automatically 
using the Schwarz Information Criterion. The bandwidths in the kernel estimations of the Levin 
Lin Chu and the Phillips Perron Fisher χ2 tests were chosen automatically using the Newey-West 
method. The test statistics follow an asymptotically normal distribution with the exception of the 
Fisher tests where the test statistic follows an asymptotic χ2-distribution. The probability of the null 
hypothesis not being rejected is shown in square brackets below the coefficient estimate. ***, ** and 
* signifies, respectively, that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level.
a)  The test assumes a common unit root process across the countries.
b)  The test assumes an individual unit root process for each country.
The relatively small number of observations along the time dimension and the 
well-known reliability problems of panel unit root tests may explain the somewhat 
mixed results. In the following analyses we will generally presume that FH and 
EBRD are stationary series, but also consider the consequences of the series 
having a unit root. The results in Table 1 are qualitatively unchanged if the sample 
is shortened by excluding the early transition years. Changes to the estimation 
methods, e.g. by setting lag lengths equal to 1, affect the results only marginally. 
To explore the time series properties further and to commence the testing 
of linkages between political and economic reforms, Table 2 presents tests for 
Granger causality between FH and EBRD using different samples. FH(–1)  Linkages between Political and Economic Reforms in Post-Communist Countries  125
EBRD signifies the null hypothesis that the variable FH does not Granger cause 
the variable EBRD, i.e. that the lagged value of FH does not help explain EBRD 
beyond a lag of EBRD. Correspondingly, EBRD(–1)  FH means that EBRD 
does not Granger cause FH. The tests are carried out using one period lags to 
conserve degrees of freedom, but the results are qualitatively similar if two lags are 
used.
Table 2: Granger causality tests, 27 transition countries, 1991–2005
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5)
91-05 91-97 98-05 91-91 92-92
FH(–1)  EBRD
106.80*** 41.56*** 23.27*** 32.34*** 17.88***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
EBRD(–1)  FH
0.08 0.52 0.56 0.06 2.09
[0.783] [0.474] [0.453] [0.806] [0.161]
ΔFH(–1)  ΔEBRD
66.18*** 31.23*** 7.40*** 75.10*** 9.26***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.006]
ΔEBRD(–1)  ΔFH
0.13 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.04
[0.723] [0.650] [0.897] [0.942] [0.853]
Observations 405 189 216 27 27
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the preceding variable does not Granger cause the following 
variable. The lag length is one period. The test statistics follows an F-distribution. The probability of 
the null hypothesis not being rejected is shown in square brackets below the coefficient estimate. ***, 
** and * signifies, respectively, that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
level.
The null hypothesis that the democracy index does not Granger cause the 
economic reform index is strongly rejected regardless of the sample, while the 
hypothesis that the economic reform index does not cause the democracy level 
cannot be rejected. We also examined Granger causation for the time differenced 
variables ΔFH and ΔEBRD and attained qualitatively similar results: changes in 
the level of democracy Granger cause changes in the level of economic reform, 
while changes in economic reform have no impact on changes in the democracy 
index. 
To conclude, the Granger causality tests suggest that democratic reform 
is a precursor for economic reforms, while economic reforms do not affect the 
democratic situation in a similar way. These results are not only driven by the 
rapid changes taking place in Central and Eastern European countries in the early 
stages of the transition, but also hold at later stages of transition, i.e. 1998–2005. 126  Karsten Staehr
Economic reforms establishing market-economic relations have been no guarantee 
against a democratic setback in the transition countries. 
5. Panel Data Estimations 
This section expands on the results from the Granger causality tests by including 
a number of covariates and by modelling the reform indices explicitly using panel 
data econometrics.
We employ a number of covariates. The output growth rate GY and the 
logarithmic inflation rate LΠ vary a great deal, especially during the early stages of 
transition. A dummy variable, WAR, takes the value 1 for years in which a country 
has been exposed to war or civil strife and is otherwise 0. The variable EUAPP 
takes the value 1 starting from the year a country has applied for EU membership 
and until the end of the sample, and is otherwise 0. A time trend TT increases 
linearly from 1 in 1989 to 17 in 2005.
Two time-invariant variables denote the initial conditions of the countries at 
the onset of the transition process, i.e. around 1990. The variables are composite 
indices constructed by de Melo et al. (2001) using principal component analysis 
to derive common factors of a large number of variables, inter alia income level, 
urbanisation, natural resource endowment, years under communist rule and 
administrative experience. The variable INIDL reflects the country’s initial indus-
trial, urbanisation and development levels. The variable INIMD reflects the initial 
macroeconomic distortions and the extent of unfamiliarity with market economic 
processes. INIDL and INIMD have no observations for Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia and Montenegro and these two countries do not appear in the following 
estimations. A third time-invariant variable, DUDST, measures the distance in 
1000 km from Düsseldorf in Germany to the capital of the post-communist 
country. The variable is sometimes used as a proxy for the extent of cultural and 
economic closeness to Western Europe (Fischer & Sahay 2004). 
Table 3 shows panel data estimations where, respectively, FH and EBRD are 
regressed on lags of the two variables and the covariates discussed above. Columns 
(3.1) and (3.2) present the estimation results on models where the time-invariant 
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Table 3. Panel estimation of democracy (FH) and economic reforms (EBRD)
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
FH EBRD FH EBRD FH EBRD
FH(–1)
0.78*** 0.068*** 0.57*** 0.053** 0.50*** 0.11***
(0.051) (0.013) (0.054) (0.016 (0.169) (0.024)
EBRD(–1)
0.042 0.85*** 0.049 0.61** –0.16 0.86***
(0.073) (0.033) (0.149) (0.061) (0.211) (0.034)
GY(–1)
–0.0065 –0.0018 –0.0020 –0.0005 0.011 0.00002
(0.0040) (0.0015) (0.0040) (0.0014) (0.0145) (0.0026)
LΠ(–1)
–0.107** 0.050*** –0.035 0.021 –0.025 0.078***
(0.054) (0.016) (0.060) (0.014) (0.125) (0.024)
WAR
–0.42*** –0.17*** –0.64*** –0.19*** 0.007 –0.24**
(0.162) (0.043) (0.156) (0.038) (0.551) (0.102)
EUAPP
0.17** –0.13*** 0.34*** –0.13*** 0.25 –0.16***
(0.080) (0.028) (0.115) (0.043) (0.378) (0.0445)
INIDL
0.15** 0.056*** .. .. .. ..
(0.058) (0.019)
INIMD
–0.11*** –0.063*** .. .. .. ..
(0.043) (0.017)
DUDST
–0.090** 0.040*** .. .. .. ..
(0.044) (0.013)
TT
–0.018** 0.0018 .. .. .. ..
(0.0090) (0.0030)
Constant




No No Yes Yes .. ..
Year 
  dummies
No No Yes Yes No No





Time sample 91-05 91-05 91-05 91-05 91-05 91-05
R2 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.98 .. ..
Notes: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro are excluded because of a lack of data. 
White’s robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * 
signifies, respectively, that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%, 
5% and 10% confidence level.
a)  The instruments are lagged values of levels of the dependent variable expanding over time 
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It follows from (3.1) that the extent of democratisation FH exhibits substantial 
autocorrelation, but does not depend on lagged values of the economic reform 
index EBRD. Among the macroeconomic variables only the inflation rate is signif-
icant; higher inflation tends to bring about less democratic rule.3 The variable for 
civil strife attains a negative and highly significant coefficient estimate, as would be 
expected. EU application leads to more democratisation. The Copenhagen criteria 
for EU expansion stipulate that member countries attain democratic governance; 
the estimation results suggest that the requirement has had the intended effect 
and strengthened democracy in applicant countries. The further away the capital 
is from Düsseldorf, the less democracy is present in the country. We have tried to 
include separate dummies for the six country groups defined in Section 3. The 
only significant regional dummy is the one for the Central Asian countries, which 
attains a negative coefficient (not shown), while the variable DUDST meanwhile 
changes sign. In other words, the negative relation between the distance to 
Düsseldorf and democracy relates mainly to the Central Asian countries. The 
variables depicting the countries’ initial conditions are both significant. An initial 
high development level is positively correlated with political liberalisation, while 
macroeconomic and administrative distortions have led to less reform.  
Column (3.2) shows that the extent of economic reforms, EBRD, also 
exhibits substantial persistence, but the lagged FH index enters positively and is 
highly significant. Higher inflation appears to speed up economic reform while 
economic growth has no effect. Civil strife slows down economic reforms. Applica-
tion to the EU reduces the level of economic reform as measured by EBRD. This 
result appears at first glance paradoxical as the Copenhagen criteria also stipulate 
that membership requires a functioning market economy. Still, large parts of the 
EU acquis communitaire involve increased regulation and more administrative 
decision-making. It has been argued that EU membership could lead to increased 
bureaucracy and impede market-conforming economic reform (Gacs 1999, IMF 
2000). Our results would support such a view, although it should be remarked that 
the coefficient is relatively sensitive to changes in the sample.
The coefficient to the distance to Düsseldorf is significant and positive. This 
suggests that the slow economic reform progress in e.g. the Central Asian countries 
is not the result of the geographical or cultural distance to Western Europe per 
se. This finding is confirmed when the six regional dummies are included (not 
shown). The regional dummy for the Balkan countries is the only one attaining 
significance (at the 5%-level) and the coefficient to DUDST is still positive and 
significant. 
3  Economic growth does not appear to have fostered democracy. This result is consistent with the 
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The results in (3.1)–(3.2) are robust to a number of specification changes 
of the panel model. i) The impact of the initial conditions may weaken over 
time. We have experimented with versions of the estimations in which the initial 
conditions INIDL and INIMD were replaced as covariates by INIDL·(20–TT) 
and INIMD·(20–TT). Overall, the results (not shown) were little changed, 
but the new covariates were less precisely estimated. ii) The two macroeconomic 
variables GY and LΠ are correlated (with a correlation coefficient equal to –0.47 
for the sample 1991–2005). Dropping GY(–1) leads the coefficients to LΠ(–1) 
to be more precisely estimated; dropping LΠ(–1) has no effect on the coefficient 
to GY(–1) in the FH equation, but makes the coefficient to GY(–1) significant 
in the EBRD equation. iii) Changes of the sample reveal that the main results 
survive estimations using even very short samples, but the significance levels – and 
occasionally also the signs – of especially the macroeconomic variables change with 
the sample size. The EBRD equation is much more robust to sample shortening 
than the FH equation. 
As a further robustness check, we repeated the estimations but with both 
country and time specific effects (and with the time-invariant variables removed 
to avoid perfect collinearity). The results are shown in Columns (3.3)-(3.4). 
As expected, the autoregressive coefficients drop somewhat, but otherwise the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors change relatively little with the exception 
of the coefficients to the lagged inflation, which are now insignificant. The latter 
result suggests that the inflation variable, which peaked in the early transition 
phase in most countries, essentially picked up time-dependent variation and 
otherwise possesses little explanatory power. 
Panel data estimations with lagged dependent variables generally imply that 
OLS estimates will be inconsistent. A number of alternative estimation methods 
have been suggested, although none are ideal in datasets with few observations 
(Judson & Owen 1999). Columns (3.5)-(3.6) show the results using the 
Arellano-Bond one-step estimator. The regression is time-differenced to eliminate 
country-specific effects and then estimated by GMM using as instruments lagged 
levels of the dependent variable expanding over time as new predetermined values 
become available. Column (3.5) has only one significant variable, viz. the lagged 
dependent variable. The unsatisfactory statistical properties are likely the result of 
the lagged levels of the discrete FH index being poor instruments in the GMM 
estimation. Comparing the results in Column (3.6) with those in (3.4) it follows 
that using the GMM Arellano-Bond method has only little effect in this case. 
The overall picture from the panel data estimations is that it is possible to 
estimate dynamic panel models explaining a large part of the variation in FH and 
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interpretations. Overall, the estimations suggest that initial conditions play an 
important role in the choice of political and economic reforms in post-communist 
countries. Civil strife sets back reform, while among the macroeconomic variables 
only inflation plays a role and the effect is concentrated on the early parts of the 
sample. Democratisation is an important catalyst for economic reforms, while 
economic reforms appear to have no effect on the policy reform process. 
6. Cointegration and Adjustment
We argued in Section 4 that the time series properties of the panel variables FH 
and EBRD were difficult to ascertain. Moreover, Figure 3 suggests that the two 
variables are closely correlated at least during the later stages of transition. To 
provide additional robustness checks of the analyses above and to ensure that 
information in the data on the dynamic properties is fully utilised, we seek in 
this section to estimate a “long-term” cointegrating relationship between FH and 
EBRD and the adjustment process towards this “long-term” relationship. 
The first step entails finding the number of cointegrating vectors between 
FH and EBRD using the Johansen procedure. In a model with constants in 
the cointegrating and the adjustment equations, a Trace test clearly rejects the 
hypothesis that there are no cointegrating vectors (Trace statistic is 84.1 with a 
5% critical value equal to 15.5), but the test cannot reject that there is at most 
one integrating vector (Trace statistic is 1.16 with a 5% critical value equal to 
3.84).4 The Maximum Eigenvalue test also produces the result that there is one 
cointegrating vector. 
Table 4 shows the different results of joint estimation of the cointegrating 
relationship and the error correcting dynamics for FH and EBRD. Columns (4.1)-
(4.2) give the results when no exogenous variables beyond constants are included. 
Notice that in this sparsely parameterised VECM, the cointegrating relation 
assumes homogeneity across the cross-sectional dimension as it exhibits the same 
slope coefficient and the same constant for all countries in the sample. The coef-
ficient to FH(–1) in the cointegrating equation is normalised to 1; the coefficient 
to EBRD(–1) is estimated very precisely to –3.07 and the constant is 3.33. 
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Table 4. Cointegration and error correction of FH and EBRD
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6)
Cointegration 




Constant 3.33 1.57 1.82
Error correction ΔFH ΔEBRD ΔFH ΔEBRD ΔFH ΔEBRD
ECa) –0.014 0.047*** 0.0059 0.063*** –0.011 0.064***
(0.0157) (0.0047) (0.0219) (0.0066) (0.0221) (0.0066)
ΔFH(–1)
0.053 0.043*** 0.021 0.028* 0.0002 0.018
(0.0454) (0.014) (0.0492) (0.0148) (0.0493) (0.0148)
ΔEBRD(–1)
–0.0022 0.22*** –0.051 0.18*** –0.15 0.15***
(0.134) (0.0404) (0.136) (0.0409) (0.138 (0.0413)
ΔGY(–1)
.. .. 0.00067 –0.00023 –0.0007 –0.0002
(0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0011)
ΔLΠ(–1)
.. .. –0.0077 –0.0019 –0.064 –0.0031
(0.0440) (0.0013) (0.0435) (0.0130)
WAR
.. .. –0.28** –0.10*** –0.28** –0.12***
(0.118) (0.0353) (0.116) (0.0349)
EUAPP
.. .. –0.0022 –0.079*** –0.19** –0.107***
(0.0590) (0.0177) (0.077) (0.0231)
INIDL
.. .. .. .. 0.069 0.049**
(0.0563) (0.0169)
INIMD
.. .. .. .. –0.063 –0.049***
(0.0448) (0.0134)
DUDST
.. .. .. .. –0.036 0.036***
(0.0358) (0.0107)
Constant
0.058* 0.094*** 0.087** 0.13*** 0.23** 0.060***
(0.0331) (0.0100) (0.0417) (0.0125) (0.0922) (0.0276)
Country dummies No No No No No No
Year dummies No No No No No No
Method VECM VECM VECM VECM VECM VECM
Time sample 91-05 91-05 91-05 91-05 91-05 91-05
R2 0.004 0.39 0.03 0.41 0.07 0.44
Notes: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro are excluded. Standard errors are shown in 
brackets below the coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * signifies, respectively, that the null hypothesis 
of the coefficient being equal to 0 is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
a)  The error correction term, EC, is found from the cointegrating relationship as EC = 
FH(–1) + α·EBRD(–1) + Constant, where α is the estimated coefficient to EBRD and 
Constant is the constant term from the cointegration relationship. 132  Karsten Staehr
The “short-term” error correction specifications are estimated using time-
differenced variables, except for the error correction term EC. The Δ-operator 
denotes the time difference so e.g. ΔFH = FH – FH(–1). The error correction 
estimation in Column (4.1) shows that there is no feedback from the “long-term” 
disequilibrium to short-term changes in FH; overall, the equation has little or no 
explanatory power. A disequilibrium, however, affects the short-term adjustment 
of EBRD. A positive EC – resulting from much democratisation and/or little eco-
nomic reform – leads to more economic reform. ΔEBRD also depends positively 
on ΔFH(–1) and ΔEBRD(–1). It should be noted that the homogenous cointegra-
tion in combination with the absence of country-specific dummies implies that 
EBRD adjusts so that the same long-term relationship holds for all countries. 
Overall, the picture from applying the Johansen methodology corresponds closely 
to the findings in sections 4 and 5. Political liberalisation affects economic reform 
positively, while the reverse causality is small or non-existent.
The somewhat inconclusive results with respect to the integration order of 
GY and LΠ complicate the inclusion of these variables as covariates. Columns 
(4.3)-(4.4) show the results when GY and LΠ in time-differenced form are added 
to the previous system along with the dummy variables WAR and EUAPP. The 
dynamics of the system are unchanged and the only covariates attaining statistical 
significance are the conflict dummy and the EU application dummy for EBRD. 
The macroeconomic variables appear unimportant. The coefficients to the EU 
application dummy attain the signs found previously (Table 3), but the estimated 
coefficients are insignificant. 
We have checked the robustness of the results in (4.3)-(4.4) by including the 
two macroeconomic variables GY and LΠ without taking time differences, but 
the variables remain insignificant in both equations and the overall effect on the 
system is small. We have also included dummies for country-specific effects in the 
error-correcting specification; it is generally difficult to attain reasonable coefficient 
estimates in the long-term specification unless the first two or three years of the 
estimation sample are left out. 
The findings above suggest that country-specific effects could be of impor-
tance. We have therefore added three time-invariant variables – INIDL, INIMD 
and DUDST – to the system in (4.3)-(4.4). Columns (4.5)-(4.6) show that the 
overall dynamic structure of the system is unchanged. As before, macroeconomic 
variables are unimportant, while the coefficients to the WAR and EUAPP 
dummies are significant. The time-invariant variables are not significant in the 
ΔFH equation (although they enter with the previously found sign pattern); the 
time-invariant variables enter significantly and with the usual signs in the ΔEBRD 
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It may be useful to assess the implications of the point estimate of the coeffi-
cient to EBRD in the long-term cointegrating relationship in Columns (4.5)-(4.6). 
First, the estimated slope is close to the slope of the straight line inserted in Figure 
3. Second, FH lies within the interval 1 to 7, while EBRD lies within the interval 
1 to 4.33. It thus seems reasonable that an increase in FH requires a substantially 
smaller increase in EBRD to restore “long-term equilibrium”. Third, if a country 
with initially severe political repression (FH around 1) introduces comprehensive 
democracy and FH increases by 5, then the economic reform index EBRD would 
have to increase by approximately 2 to restore equilibrium in the long term. In 
other words, the long-term equilibrium suggests that democratisation and the 
creation of a market economy are closely connected. 
The cointegration analysis confirmed previous findings with respect to the 
short-term adjustment dynamics: that political liberalisation is an important force 
behind market-based economic reforms, while economic reforms have little impact 
on political developments. It is possible to obtain a measure of the quantitative 
importance of the political transformation on economic reforms over time. 
Assume for concreteness that FH is increased from 1 to 6 in one year. A simulation 
of the system in (4.5)-(4.6) suggests that such a political change, ceteris paribus, 
increases the economic reform index EBRD by approximately 1.2 points after 5 
years and 1.6 points after 10 years. Using the system in (4.3)-(4.4), the effect is 
somewhat larger. In conclusion, political liberalisation affects economic reforms in 
a significant way, in both statistical and numerical terms.
It should be underscored that the results to some extent rest on the sample 
comprising the entire post-communism period. This is not very surprising in light 
of the rapid changes in post-communist countries. Starting the estimation in later 
years tends to lower the estimated coefficient to EC and/or increase the estimated 
coefficient to ΔFH(–1) in (4.3), with the result that EBRD is less autonomously 
determined. Still, the overall result remains that EBRD react to disequilibria more 
than FH does.
We have treated the growth rate GY as exogenous when estimating the 
systems of FH and EBRD. This followed from preliminary analyses where GY 
was also incorporated into the cointegration vector as an endogenous variable. We 
found, however, that GY does not cointegrate with any of the other two variables 
in the system (but – possibly – with itself, i.e. GY is stationary). This is consistent 
with the fact that the GY series is highly fluctuating and likely to be imprecisely 
measured: growth in the transition countries was disrupted by the collapse of 
central planning and control, the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and 
the erection of trade barriers. The large drops in official registered output in the 
early phases of the transition process are likely overstated (Aslund 2002: 135-140, 134  Karsten Staehr
Campos & Coricelli 2002). Similarly, incorporating the logarithmic inflation 
rate LΠ into the cointegrating vector did not prove successful, and the variable 
has been treated as exogenous with respect to the variables entering the analysed 
regression models. 
7. Final Comments
The collapse of communism and central planning and the challenges stemming 
from the dual transition have put the spotlight on possible linkages between 
political change and economic reform. Knowledge concerning the interplay of 
political and economic transformation may increase our understanding of ongoing 
developments in many post-communist countries. 
In the early 1990s, experiences from Southeast Asia and Latin America 
suggested that post-communist countries could have difficulty combining 
liberal democratic rule and fundamental economic restructuring. This concern 
was emphasised by theoretical work focusing on public preferences under ex 
ante uncertainty. Evidence from the 1990s proved these concerns unjustified: 
post-communist countries that introduced democratic rule and civil rights also 
reformed their economies most thoroughly. 
This paper has analysed the dual transition and its dynamics in more detail, 
with broadly similar conclusions across different econometric methods. Democra-
tisation has preceded market reform, while market reforms do not appear to have 
affected political developments to any major extent. Macroeconomic performance 
has only affected political and economic reforms marginally if at all. The most 
likely effect would be one from high inflation to reduced political freedom, but the 
effect is imprecisely estimated and unstable over time. Wars and civil strife have an 
unambiguously negative effect on both political freedoms and economic reforms. 
The prospect of EU membership appears to have reinforced democratisation, but 
possibly slowed down economic reforms in applicant countries.
Initial conditions have played a major role in the outcome of the transition. 
Countries that started with a low level of development have generally retained 
authoritarian means of government rule and have also introduced few market 
economic reforms. Likewise, countries are more likely to have undertaken little 
political and economic reform if they had large macroeconomic distortions in the 
pre-reform planned economy and were unfamiliar with a market economic system. 
On the other hand, geography per se appears to have played only a minor role in 
the observed pattern of political and economic reform. 
As all empirical investigation in this area, this analysis in this paper is 
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changing political and economic fault lines. Still, the main conclusions appear 
robust and the econometric evidence fits the overall picture of the dual transition 
well. The westernmost post-communist countries had the most favourable 
starting points and pursued both political and economic reforms in a process 
where political reforms added momentum to the economic reform process. The 
Central Asian republics had less favourable starting points and have remained 
“trapped” in a state with few political and economic reforms. The remaining 
post-communist countries in the Balkans, Western CIS and the Caucasus started 
out with “intermediate” initial conditions. In these countries shocks to internal or 
external concord and possibly also to economic stability have had a large effect on 
the implementation of the reforms comprising the dual transition. 
Appendix:  
variable Description and Data sources 
DUDST  Distance in 1000 km from capital to Düsseldorf, Germany; time-
invariant. Source: Fischer & Sahay (2004) corrected and supple-
mented with data from http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/.
EBRD  Aggregate economic reform index, average of 8 indices for: (1) price 
liberalisation, (2) liberalisation of foreign trade and exchange, (3) 
small scale privatisation, (4) large scale privatisation, (5) enterprise 
restructuring, (6) competition policy, (7) reform of banking and 
interest rate determination, (8) reforms of securities markets and 
non-bank financial institutions. Source: EBRD (2006).
EUAPP   Dummy variable equal to 1 from the year of EU application; 
otherwise 0. Source: http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm.
FH  Index increasing in political rights and civil liberties; calculated as 8 
minus the average of the indices for political rights and civil liber-
ties. FH of the Soviet Union is used for the Baltics, Western CIS, 
Caucasus and Central Asia for 1989-91. FH for Czechoslovakia is 
used for the Czech Republic and Slovakia for 1989-92. FH for Serbia 
and Montenegro is used for Slovenia (1988-90), Croatia (1988-90), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (1988-91). Source: Freedom 
House (2006).
GY   Economic growth, % per year. Source: EBRD (2006); selected early 
observations from EBRD (1994-2000).136  Karsten Staehr
INIDL  Index capturing the initial extent of (over-) industrialisation, urbani-
sation and development level; time-invariant. Source: de Melo et al. 
(2001); data for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro are 
missing.
INIMD  Index capturing the initial macroeconomic distortions and the 
unfamiliarity with market economic processes of the administration 
and the public; time-invariant. Source: de Melo et al. (2001); data 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro missing.
LΠ  Logarithm to the annual inflation rate in % plus 100. Source: 
EBRD (2006); selected early observations from EBRD (1994-2000); 
missing observations for 1989-90 for some ex-Soviet countries have 
been replaced by corresponding values for Russia; a missing observa-
tion for Croatia for 1989 has been replaced by the corresponding 
value for Serbia and Montenegro.
WAR  Dummy variable equal to 1 for years in which a country 
has witnessed war or civil strife, otherwise 0. Source: Own 
coding based on http://www.crisisgroup. org/home/ and 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/.
References
Acemoglu, Daron & James Robinson, 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johanson, James Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2005. 
“Income and Democracy”, NBER Working Paper, no. 11205.
Alesina, Alberto & Allan Drazen, 1991. “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?”, 
American Economic Review, 81(5): 217–291.
Armijo, Leslie, Thomas Biersteker & Abraham Lowenthal, 1994. “The Problems 
of Simultaneous Transitions”, Journal of Democracy, 5(4), pp.161–175.
Aslund, Anders, 2002. Building Capitalism. The Transformation of the Former Soviet 
Bloc, Cambridge University Press.
Blanchard, Olivier, Rudiger Dornbusch, Richard Layard, Lawrence Summers & 
Paul Krugman, 1991. Reform in Eastern Europe, MIT Press.
Bunce, Valerie, 2001. “Democratization and Economic Reform”, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 4: 43–65.Linkages between Political and Economic Reforms in Post-Communist Countries  137
Bunce, Valerie, 2003. “Rethinking Recent Democratizations. Lessons from the 
Postcommunist Experience”, World Politics, 55: 167–192.
Campos, Nauro & Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002. “Growth in Transition: What We 
Know, What We Don’t, and What We Should”, Journal of Economic Literature, 
90(3): 793–836.
de Melo, Martha, Cevdet Denizer, Alan Gelb & Stoyan Tenev, 1996. “Circum-
stance and Choice: The Role of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transition 
Economies”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1866, World Bank. Journal 
version published in 2001, World Bank Economic Review, 15(1): 1–31.
Dethier, Jean-Jacques, Hafez Ghanem & Edda Zoli, 1999. “Does Democracy 
Facilitate the Economic Transition? An Empirical Study of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2194, 
World Bank.
Diamond, Larry, 1999) Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation, Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
EBRD, 1994–2000) Transition Report, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
EBRD, 2006): “Macroeconomic indicators” and “Structural indicators”, Web-
based databases (June), http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm. 
Falcetti, Elisabetta, Tatiana Lysenko & Peter Sanfey, 2005. “Reforms and Growth 
in Transition: Re-examining the Evidence”, Working Paper No. 90, EBRD.
Fernandez, Raquel & Dani Rodrik, 1991. “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias 
in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”, American Economic Review, 
81(5): 1146–1155.
Fidrmuc, Jan, 2000. “Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in 
Transition Countries”, European Economic Review 44(8): 1491–1513.
Fidrmuc, Jan, 2003. “Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth during Post 
Communist Transition”, European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3): 583–604.
Fischer, Stanley & Ratna Sahay, 2004. “Transition Economies: The Role of 
Institutions and Initial Conditions”, Festschrift in Honor of Guillermo A. Calvo, 
IMF, Washington D.C.
Freedom House, 2006. “FH Country Rankings”, http://www.freedomhouse.org.138  Karsten Staehr
Gacs, Janos (1999): “Accession to the EU: A Continuation or a Departure from 
Transition Reforms?”, IIASA Interim report, No. IR-99-002.
IMF (2000): “Accession of Transition Economies to the European Union: Pros-
pects and Pressures”, ch. IV in World Economic Outlook  (October), International 
Monetary Fund.
Judson, Ruth & Ann Owen, 1999. “Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A 
Practical Guide for Macroeconomists”, Economic Letters, 65(1): 9–15.
Kim, Byung-Yeon & Jukka Pirttila, 2003. “The Political Economy of Reforms: 
Empirical Evidence from Post-Communist Transition in the 1990s”, BOFIT 
Discussion Papers No. 4/2003, Bank of Finland.
Kitschelt, Herbert, 2001. “Post-Communist Economic Reform. Causal Mecha-
nisms and Concomitant Properties”, Working Paper, Duke University.
Kostadinova, Petia, 2004. “Initial Conditions and Economic Reform in Eastern 
Europe”, mimeo, http://plaza.ufl.edu/petiak/initialconditions.pdf.
Kwon, Hyeok Yong, 2004. “Economic Reform and Democratization: Evidence 
from Latin America and Post-Socialist Countries”, British Journal of Political 
Science, 34(2): 357–370.
Lipset, Martin, 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Develop-
ment and Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review, 53(1): 69–105.
Norgaard, Ole, 2000. Economic Institutions and Democratic Reform, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, Northampton.
North, Douglas, 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur, 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy and, Development”, American 
Political Science Review, 87(3): 567–576.
Ricardo, David, 1817. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 3rd ed. 
published in 1821, John Murray, London.
Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. “Government in transition”, European Economic Review, 
41(3-5): 385–410.
Wykoff, Frank, 2001. “Creating Capitalism: Politics, Reforms, and Economic 
Performance”, Working Paper No. 2001-17, Claremont Colleges. 